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Abstract 
Many power markets around the world have been 
facing inadequacy with generation capacity 
investment to meet the growing demand. Among 
various frameworks directed towards this problem, 
capacity markets have emerged in major eastern US 
power markets. In this paper, a prototype capacity 
market is discussed which is consistent with the trend 
of convergence of market design. Based on this, the 
critical role of the reference capacity price is brought 
up, followed by a detailed explanation of its 
economic rationale and concerns. Noted with the 
necessity of a systematic pricing scheme to determine 
the value of the reference capacity price, a pricing 
model based on the general Black-Scholes contingent 
claim framework is proposed. In this model, the 
capacity value is treated as a path-dependent 
derivative with electricity prices and natural gas 
prices as underlyings. Numerical study is conducted 
to prove model validity with a lattice approach 
adopted. 
 
 
1. Introduction  
 
1.1 The long-term resource adequacy 
problem facing the power industry 
  
Many power markets around the world are facing 
a shortage of generation capacity investment，and 
this issue has been seriously treated as a long-term 
generation resource adequacy problem [1] [2]. In 
contrast to the short-term adequacy problem which 
mainly relies on the spinning reserve to meet an 
unexpected demand increase, the long-term 
generation adequacy issue emphases on meeting the 
annual peak demand and should be ensured by a 
sustained investment in new capacity. In addition, a 
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long-term market equilibrium implies an appropriate 
level of investment in generation capacity with right 
amount, right type, and right location.  
In a deregulated power industry, individual 
customer who benefits from a reliable system has no 
incentive to be responsible for system reliability. 
Consequently, customers would enjoy being free 
riders in the system rather than paying for reliability, 
which shows the public goods attribute of capacity 
[3]. In order to finance adequate generation addition, 
it is necessary to price capacity properly in the first 
place.  
Market regulators around the world hold different 
perspectives toward this long-term investment 
adequacy issue. Proposed solutions include the 
capacity payment in power pools [4], the two-part 
price scheme in China, the energy only market design 
[5], the New Electricity Trading Arrangement 
(NETA) with a proper price cap in the UK [6] [7], the 
call option obligation scheme [8], and the capacity 
market proposal[9] - [11]. It is important to realize 
that the effectiveness of these proposed solutions 
should not be judged based on themselves alone, but 
on its harmony being fitted with other components in 
the industry, e.g. the primary energy market, the 
regulation depth, and the energy law, etc.  
The focus of this paper is the capacity market 
proposal which has been implemented by three major 
Independent System Operators (ISOs) in eastern US 
namely NYISO, ISO-NE, and PJM. 
 
1.2 The market place for trading long-term 
capacity 
 
Although there are different versions of capacity 
market design, principally they tend to converge 
through time. A prototype capacity market mainly 
consists of a primary annual auction and some 
following adjustment auctions. Here, we only 
concentrate on the primary auction in which most 
transactions occur. In order to accommodate new 
projects into bidding as competitors with existing 
generating units, the auction should be conducted 
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 about 3 years before real time delivery to count for 
construction time. The commodity traded in the 
market is unforced capacity (UCAP), which is the 
installed capacity (ICAP) with forced outage in 
consideration. The market uses the pay-as-clearing 
scheme. On the supply side, each unit bid according 
to the net going forward cost of its capacity [12]. On 
the demand side, where the distinct feature of the 
capacity market emerges, all customers are 
collectively represented by a downward sloping 
demand curve which is determined by the ISO. This 
shows the strong regulatory role played by the ISO in 
the capacity market. Looking at the way that the 
demand curve is determined, the most critical point 
on the curve is a reference point which is set by a 
reference capacity quantity and a reference capacity 
price. The reference quantity is calculated as the 
forecasted annual peak demand of the delivery year 
with reserve margin considered. More complicated 
than setting the reference quantity, the reference price 
is determined according to the economics of a 
benchmark combustion gas turbine (GT). The 
reference capacity price orients the capacity market 
in a way that potential investors are informed with 
the system perspective on a reasonable capacity 
value.  
Many distinguished researchers have contributed 
on the discussion of the microstructure of the 
capacity market [9]-[14]. Focusing on the reference 
capacity price, this paper aims to explain the 
economic rationale behind this reference price and to 
propose a pricing scheme to determine its value using 
financial engineering methods.  
The following parts of this paper are arranged as: 
Part 2. The economic rationale behind the reference 
capacity price is explained and related concerns are 
raised; Part 3. A pricing model is proposed to 
calculate the reference price systematically; Part 4. A 
numerical example is implemented to show the 
validity of the pricing model; Part 5. The conclusion 
is drawn. 
 
2. The reference capacity price: economic 
rationale and concerns 
 
2.1. The reference price provide benchmark 
for capacity financing compensation 
 
In the primary energy market, gas turbine (GT) 
normally becomes the type of marginal units when 
the demand reaches certain high level. Theoretically, 
GTs rely on electricity price spikes during those 
demand peaks to recover their fixed costs. 
Unfortunately, the price cap enforced on the 
electricity price has caused difficulty for GTs to fully 
recover their fixed costs solely by selling electricity. 
This difficulty in capacity financing is referred as the 
“missing money” problem. The emerging capacity 
market is expected to compensate for this “missing 
money” so as to help finance capacity. In the capacity 
market, the reference price is calculated as deducting 
from its amortized fixed cost the expected yearly 
profit of a peaking GT obtained in the Energy and 
ancillary service (E&AS) market. This formulation 
aims to use the corresponding cost of a GT as the 
compensation benchmark for capacity financing. In 
addition, in the annual capacity auction, the 
discrepancy between the final market clearing price 
and the reference price also tells investors about the 
situation of generation adequacy in the system. As we 
assume GTs take the role of benchmark, the incentive 
from this market would tend to add new GTs. There 
is a concern that the resulting generation mix could 
be vulnerable to the natural gas price risk.  
The compensation is provided through a market 
mechanism while with regulatory body involved. 
This is because capacity for reliability is mixed good 
with both public and private properties. In [15], 
capacity is separated into two attributes, i.e. security 
as public good and adequacy as private good. The 
problem of mixed goods can date back to 
Samuelson’s initial exploration of the properties of 
public goods in [16].  
 
2.2. The reference price helps smooth the 
investment cycle and improve economic 
efficiency 
 
The provision of a reference capacity price 
intends to send a signal about more predictable 
revenue to potential investors. Consequently, the 
investment cycle experienced by the power industry 
is expected to be smoothed [17]. However, whether 
the investment signal sent by the ISO through the 
capacity market and the expectation from potential 
investors could match synchronously needs to be 
tested in reality. A similar case is with the capital 
market which also experiences cycles. Some 
researchers argue that due to monetary policy time 
lags, changes in the growth rate of the money supply 
indicated by a feedback rule can actually result in an 
increase in the size of the economic cycles. For this 
reason, monetary policy based on a feedback rule will 
not necessarily stabilize aggregate demand or 
inflation, although that is their intent [18]. The way 
that capacity market runs can be considered as a 
feedback-rule policy as well. In the capacity market, 
the price is adjusted yearly according to the feedback 
from the changing economic environment. Due to the 
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 time lag caused by construction time of power plants, 
when new capacity is built, the underlying economy 
may have changed far from the forecast made years 
ago. Hence, the time lag effect should be considered 
in the market design. In order to ensure reliable and 
predictable revenue, the reference price should be set 
at a rational value. 
The capacity market also intends to achieve 
economically efficient resource allocation through 
inducing the optimal generation mix. Within an 
uncertain reliability environment, the tradeoff 
between the protection of reliability and the added 
costs must be balanced in the market design.  
 
2.3. The reference price enforces the pooling 
function 
 
The use of a single reference price in the capacity 
market shows the perspective that all capacity 
contributes the same to system long-term reliability. 
Rather than depending on individual generation 
company (Genco) to finance new capacity separately, 
the ISO could be regarded as playing the fund-raising 
role for the whole system through the capacity 
market. In the capacity market, the ISO pools 
together both the Gencos’ capacity and the demand 
of customers who are represented by load serving 
entities (LSEs). This pool function helps finance new 
capacity projects in the system. The clearing of the 
forward capacity market results in customers paying 
for using capacity, but this payment is made year by 
year rather than a one time payment to recover the 
capital cost of capacity. This inter-temporal 
borrowing and lending arrangement is similar to a 
lease payment. All material things can be lent, so 
does capacity. While, it is reasonable to question on 
the fact that base units obtain the same capacity price 
as peakers in the capacity market. In fact, base units 
normally have no difficulty to recover their fixed 
costs from the energy market even before the 
capacity market was introduced. Although generally 
we regard base units providing the same long-term 
capacity value as peakers, the profit earned from the 
capacity market is windfall profit for base units.  
 
3. A general contingent claim pricing 
model for the reference price 
 
As discussed in the above section, the reference 
capacity price is a critical factor, if not the most 
critical one, in the capacity market. Hence, a 
systematic pricing scheme should be in place to 
determine its value. As mentioned before, the 
reference price is determined according to the 
economics of a benchmark GT. More specifically, the 
reference price (assume monthly payment) is 
calculated as deducting the E&AS revenue from the 
amortized capital cost of a typical peaking GT and 
then divided by 12. Currently, the industry practice 
roughly uses a cost recovery model to estimate the 
reference price, where the revenue from E&AS 
markets is projected from previous years.  
In this paper, a systematic pricing model based on 
the Black-Scholes contingent claims pricing 
framework [19] is proposed. As we know, the value 
of capacity traded in the capacity market originates 
from the generation asset. This leads to the rationale 
to treat capacity value as a fictive contingent claim on 
parts of the value of the generation asset. In this 
pricing model, the right to sell 1MW-month capacity 
in the annual capacity market is treated as an option. 
For simplicity, we don’t consider the 3-year time lag 
which exists in the real market. The payoff of the 
option is defined as equal to the reference capacity 
price if the option is exercised, and is zero if it is 
abandoned. This option is a path-dependent 
derivative, because its payoff function involves 
calculating a GT’s expected annual profit from the 
energy market, which depends on the entire paths of 
the electricity price and natural gas price of the year.  
The hourly electricity price ( )eP t?  and the hourly 
natural gas price ( )gP t?  are chosen as the underlying 
state variables of this option. These two underlyings 
are assumed as following two correlated Geometric 
Brownian Motions (GBMs). Considering the non-
storable feature of the spot electricity, a hypothetical 
hourly forward electricity price ( )feP t?  is used for 
hedging, which is assumed as derived from the spot 
price ( )eP t? . We define the spot price dynamics 
satisfy e e e e e edP P dt P dzμ σ= +? ? ? ?  
Inspired by [20] [21], the hourly forward price 
dynamics should satisfy 
( )f f f f fe e e e e e e edP P dt P dzμ λ σ σ= − +? ? ? ?  
e
e f
e
r
where
μλ
σ
−
= , and f te e e
ασ σ −= ⋅ , 
In which eλ is the market price of risk, and α models 
the effect that the volatility of a forward price is 
lower than the corresponding spot volatity. Similarly, 
we define the GBM for the natural gas price process 
as 
g g g g g gdP P dt P dzμ σ= +? ? ? ?  
The correlation is modeled as e gdz dz dtρ=? ?  
where ρ is the correlation coefficient between these 
two underlying processes.  
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 Define F?  as the value of the option, i.e. the right 
to sell 1MW-month capacity in the capacity market, 
which will be worth the value of this amount of 
capacity if it is exercised and no value if it is 
abandoned. Apply Ito’s lemma on F? with respect to 
f
eP  and gP  , we get 
2 2
2 2 2 2
2 2
( ( )
1 1 )
2 2
f f
e e e e g gf
ge
f f f f
e e g g e g e gf f
e g e g
f f
e e e g g gf
ge
F F FdF P P dt
P tP
F F FP P P P dt
P P P P
F FP dz P dz
PP
μ λ σ μ
σ σ ρσ σ
σ σ
∂ ∂ ∂
= − + + +
∂ ∂∂
∂ ∂ ∂
+ +
∂ ∂ ∂ ∂
∂ ∂
+ +
∂∂
? ? ?
? ? ? ?
? ? ?
Define a portfolio fe gf
ge
F FF P P
PP
π
∂ ∂
= − + +
∂∂
? ? ??  , then 
2 2
2 2 2 2
2 2
1 1(
2 2
)
f
e gf
ge
f f
e e g gf
e g
f f
e g e g f
e g
F Fd dF dP dP
PP
F F Fdt P P
t P P
FP P dt
P P
π
σ σ
ρσ σ
∂ ∂
= − + +
∂∂
∂ ∂ ∂
= + +
∂ ∂ ∂
∂
+
∂ ∂
? ? ??
? ?
? ?
 
According to the no-arbitrage assumption, we have 
 
 
 
By equating the above two equations, we get the 
Black-Scholes formula for F: 
2 2
2 2 2 2
2 2
2
1 1( )
2 2
f f f
e g e e g gf f
ge e g
f f
e g e g f
e g
F F F F Fr P P P P
t PP P P
FP P rF
P P
σ σ
ρσ σ
∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂
+ + + +
∂ ∂∂ ∂ ∂
∂
+ =
∂ ∂
     Assume we are at t=0 with t hourly indexed and 
the time to maturity is one year. Then, we denote 
F(T) as the value of F at maturity. We have the 
boundary conditions for the above Black-Scholes 
formula as: 
 
( ) max[( ) /12,0]e aF T C R R= − − ,  
1
[max( ( ) ( ),0)]
T
rt Q f
e e g
t
R e E P t H P t−
=
= − ⋅∑ ,  
where C is the annualized capital cost of a GT. H is 
the heat rate of the GT. eR  and aR are the expected 
revenue of a GT earned from the energy market and 
the ancillary market respectively. Both C and aR are 
assumed constants. The superscript Q means the 
expectation is taken under the risk-neutral measure. 
In practice, due to the exotic feature of this 
option, numerical methods are normally adopted to 
solve the Black-Scholes formula through its discrete 
approximation. One approach is to construct a 
recombining lattice, which is suitable when the 
derivative has a look-back feature. Various methods 
to build a lattice with two correlated underlying 
variables have already been proposed. Among them, 
the BEG method [22] is considered as the 
benchmark, in which the number of states at step n 
is 2( 1)n + . Another method was proposed in [23], 
which was also used in [24] for its spark spread real 
option valuation model. The most recent method was 
by [25], which is considered more efficient and is 
chosen for implementation of the pricing model in 
this paper.  
Following the method in [25], for any given time 
t, possible next hour prices are defined as 
,1 ,1
,2 ,2
,3 ,3
2
1 1
2 22
3 3
ln ( ) ln ( )
ln ( ) ln ( )
ln ( ) ln ( )
ˆ ˆ1 ln ( ) ( )
2 ˆ ˆ1
1 ˆ ˆln ( ) ( )
2
f
e g
f
e g
f
e g
f
f e x ye
x y
g
g x y
P t t P t t
P t t P t t
P t t P t t
r x r yP t r t
r x r y
P t r t r x r y
σ
σ
⎡ ⎤+ +⎢ ⎥
+ +⎢ ⎥⎢ ⎥
+ +⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦
′⎡ ⎤ ⎡ ⎤⎡ ⎤ + −⎢ ⎥ ⎢ ⎥⎢ ⎥ ⎢ ⎥= × + ⎢ ⎥⎢ ⎥ ⎢ ⎥ ⎢ ⎥⎢ ⎥ + −⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦ ⎣ ⎦⎣ ⎦
? ?
? ?
? ?
?
?
 
where 
1 1
3 1
2 2 2 2 2
1
3 3 2
0 1ˆ ˆ
1 tan1ˆ ˆ
tan 11 tanˆ ˆ
x y
x y
x y
r x r y
r x r y
r x r y
φ
φφ
−
−
−
⎡ ⎤⎡ ⎤ ⎢ ⎥⎢ ⎥ ⎡ ⎤
= ×⎢ ⎥⎢ ⎥ ⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦+⎢ ⎥⎢ ⎥ ⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦ ⎣ ⎦32
 
in which 1(sin ( )) / 2φ ρ−= and the probability is 
assumed as equal for each state at a specific stage of 
the tree. 
 
4. Numerical Example 
 
4.1. Data description 
 
A prototype peaking GT is dispatched for 
8760β ⋅ hours in a year, where the capacity factor 
β is varying with different load zones. For example, 
according to [26], β is ranging from 12% to 16% for 
New York City （NYC）, but is around only 2% for 
Rest of State (ROS) in the New York State control 
area. We also set the economic parameters based on 
[24] for a typical GT, see Table 1.  
 
 
( )fe gf
ge
F Fd r dt r F P P dt
PP
π π
∂ ∂
= = − − −
∂∂
? ? ?? ?
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 Table 1 Economic parameters of a typical GT 
Ancillary 
profit aR  
($/MWh-
year) 
Capital 
cost FC  
($/MW) 
Recovery 
period 
(years) 
Fixed 
operating 
Cost 
($/MW-
year) 
10000 831000 15 38850 
 
In order to implement the lattice to get the 
numerical solution for the Black-Scholes differential 
equation, the processes of the two underlying 
variables are set according to statistical data. Hourly 
volatility and correlation parameters are referenced   
to [27] as 0.15, 0.16, 0.42, 0.3e g egσ σ ρ α= = = = , 
and these estimates are based on the natural log of 
prices. The initial value of the natural gas price 
(0) $8 /gP MMBtu= . This is based on the NYMEX 
Henry Hub 12-month strip price, which was 
$8/MMBtu in 2007. Heat rate H =9MMBtu/MWh. 
The initial value of the electricity price 
(0) $65 /eP MWh= . This is based on the price 
duration curve of the reference bus price in New 
York State from 2005 to 2007. 
 
4.2. Numerical results 
 
The capacity market is an annual auction market, 
so the reference capacity price calculated through the 
model above is fixed for a whole year. We construct 
different scenarios as shown in the table below in 
order to see the sensitivity of the result.  
 
Table 2: Numerical results with different 
parameter settings 
Reference 
Capacity 
Price ($/KW-
month) 
0.18,
0.17,
0.42
e
g
eg
σ
σ
ρ
=
=
=
 
0.18,
0.16,
0.42
e
g
eg
σ
σ
ρ
=
=
=
 
0.18,
0.15,
0.42
e
g
eg
σ
σ
ρ
=
=
=
 
r= 0.03 5.87 5.34 3.46 
r=0.04 5.43 4.92 1.87 
r=0.05 5.51 4.58 1.86 
 
The results show that with the decrease of the 
difference between the volatilities of electricity price 
and gas price, the reference price increases, because 
the profit from the energy market decreases. When 
this difference is large enough, the revenue from the 
energy market will be adequate to cover the fixed 
cost recovery, which results in zero of capacity price.  
The reference price determined by this systematic 
approach plays a critical role in the current capacity 
market design, e.g. in the NYISO capacity market. 
The discrepancy between the market clearing price 
and the reference price sends sound economic signals 
to potential investors about the under/over capacity 
condition in the system, which serve for investment 
decisions.  
 
4.3. Comparison with real market data 
 
The reference capacity prices set by the NYISO 
for different delivery years are shown in table 3. 
 
Table 3: Reference price set by the NYISO 
NYISO NYCA  ROS ($/KW-month) 
 2005/2006 2006/2007 2007/2008 
ICAP Ref. 6.78 6.98 7.19 
 
The result calculated in our example is relatively 
lower compared with the real reference price set by 
the ISO. This is probably caused by an overestimate 
of the profit that a GT could earn from the energy 
market. For simplicity here, the profit is counted in if 
the electricity price is higher than the gas price. 
 
5. Conclusion 
 
At the emerging stage of capacity markets, many 
distinguished researchers have been working on how 
to make better design of the market microstructure. In 
response to that, the qualitative part of this paper 
explains the underlying economic rationale behind 
the capacity market in a more fundamental and 
critical sense. The quantitative part of this work 
devotes efforts on proposing a general contingent 
claim pricing model for capacity valuation. This 
approach is distinct from other real option models in 
the sense that, rather than starting by checking 
whether the capacity value could be treated as a 
financial option, it starts from the very general form 
of the Black-Scholes contingent claims framework. 
Consequently, the thought flow in this approach 
could be utilized to value other power assets even 
without an option feature. 
A capacity market is targeting on long-term 
sustainable generation investment. While due to its 
relatively young age, it will take time to see how 
much of its theoretical effectiveness could be 
justified in reality. In addition, with the progressive 
penetration of renewables into the system, possible 
adjustments on the capacity market structure is also 
worth to be considered.  
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